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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

- REFERENCES:
- A. NSC 112 and 112/1
  - B. Memos for Planning Board, November 26 and December 1, 1954
  - C. Report by State Working Group "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments", November 29, 1954
  - D. AEC Staff report, "Review of Technical Aspects Involved in the Problem of International Control of Atomic Energy" (distributed at PB meeting, December 2, 1954)

The enclosed proposed memorandum to the Special Committee to Review NSC 112 (NSC Action No. 899) and the draft of the positions asserted by State and Defense Working Group Members on the principal issues, are transmitted for Planning Board consideration.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

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December 3, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Subject: U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

1. This memorandum is addressed to you as members of a Special Committee constituted under NSC Action No. 899 (September 9, 1953) to review the policy contained in NSC 112 (July 6, 1951).

2. The Planning Board has received from the members of the Special Committee's Working Group

a. a statement by the Defense Member, with four annexes (August 27, 1954)

b. a synopsis of the Defense Member's position (November 24, 1954)

c. a statement by the State Member (November 29, 1954)

d. a statement by the AEC Member (December 2, 1954)

3. The Planning Board has considered and discussed these papers. The Board has not attempted to prepare a summary description of the plans proposed by the State and Defense Members. Instead, the Board has sought to identify the principal issues underlying the two plans and to express succinctly (in the attachment) the position asserted by the State Member and the Defense Member on these principal issues. The Board

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feels that this brief indication of opposing views <sup>should</sup> ~~will~~  
assist the Special Committee in trying to resolve the  
principal issues before consideration by the National Security  
Council on <sup>January 6, 1955</sup> ~~December 21, 1954~~.

ROBERT CUTLER  
Special Assistant to the President  
Chairman, Planning Board

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U.S. POLICY ON CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS:

AGREEMENTS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POSITIONS  
ASSERTED BY STATE AND DEFENSE WORKING GROUP  
MEMBERS ON PRINCIPAL ISSUES

1. State and Defense agree that:
  - a. No disarmament plan should be based on good faith on the part of the USSR.
  - b. Continued support of the UN Plan involves unacceptable risk to the U.S. and will be construed as hypocritical by our major allies.
2. a. State: The possibility should be tested that the USSR might consider the elimination or reduction of the threat of nuclear warfare to be in its interests.
  - b. Defense: There is no possibility of USSR agreement to a disarmament plan acceptable to U.S. security, failing the abandonment of Soviet ambitions. An effort to test this possibility through step by step negotiation and partial implementation will place the U.S. under pressure to accept a disarmament plan inimical to U.S. security.
3. a. State: The risk to U.S. survival is greater under the U.S. continuing to depend on its safeguarded retaliatory capacity to deter Soviet nuclear attack, than under the U.S. proceeding pursuant to State's phased disarmament plan.

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b. Defense: The risk to U.S. survival is less under the U.S. continuing to depend on its safeguarded retaliatory capacity to deter Soviet nuclear attack, than under any disarmament plan, in the absence of world government or the abandonment of Soviet ambitions.

4. a. State: Proceed by safeguarded phases, each beneficial to U.S. security, to a system which might become progressively more reliable and extensive (learning by experience and with the ability to discontinue, if necessary, without having impaired U.S. security).

b. Defense: As an essential pre-condition, have a comprehensive and enforceable system before any disarmament action is taken.

5. a. State: The State plan will reduce the likelihood of total nuclear war as compared to reliance on current armament trends.

b. Defense: There is less likelihood of total nuclear war in reliance on current armament trends than in reliance on any feasible disarmament plan in the absence of world government or the abandonment of Soviet ambitions.

6. a. State: It is feasible to phase proportionate reduction of atomic material so that the U.S. will always have more of it than the USSR, even allowing for some Soviet secretion and diversion.

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b. Defense: (The Soviets will not agree to any plan which continues the U.S. in a position of having more atomic material.)\*

7. a. State: Stoppage in production and a partial reduction under State's phased plan would be better, or no worse, than a continuation of present armament trends.

b. Defense: (Stoppage in production and initiation of partial reduction in atomic material will put the U.S. at a greater disadvantage in conventional power relations than a continuation of current armament trends and, among other things, will lead to allied pressure for further reductions unacceptable to U.S. security.)\*

8. a. State: Agreement and execution of control and reduction of conventional weapons will be aggressively sought, but will not be a pre-condition to agreement and execution of control and reduction of nuclear weapons.

b. Defense: Agreement on control and reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons must be the first step; subsequently, the execution of control and reduction of both types of weapons would proceed in concurrent stages to be defined in the plan.

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\*Position developed in oral discussion.

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